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Ideology influences how Congress chooses whether to give
grant aid to state governments or to run programs federally
When implementing policy, Congress can choose to allocate grants to state governments as grant
aid, or for the funds to be administered by agencies at a federal level. In new research Stuart
Kasdin and Federica Iorio look at how the dominant ideology of Congressional institutions affects
the design of such programs. They find that when Congress and a federal administration share the
same partisan orientation, the program is more likely to be administered by the central government
than as grant aid to the states, and vice versa. They also write that when an agency has a history of
grant making to the states, Congress is more likely to propose grants than central provision.
The United States is a strongly federal system in which states have separate responsibilities from
the federal government, though there is a great deal of overlap. One such area is in federal grants
in aid to state and local governments, in which the lower levels of government take responsibility for
most of the administration of federal programs and each state has some scope to interpret
according to its own preferences how the program should be carried out, the degree to which varies
by the program. Thus, grants in aid decentralize decision making authority, giving lower levels of
government the opportunity for policy making as part of the program execution. Why should the
federal government relinquish its control over policy decision making by using grants?
It isn’t as if grant in aid are a minor aspect of the federal budget or are not really important for the federal states and
have not increased significantly over the years. In 1960, for example, such grants accounted for 7.6 percent of all
federal outlays and 1.4 percent of GDP. By 2011, this grew to 16.8 percent of all federal outlays and 4.1 percent of
GDP. In 2012, close to 25 percent of total State and local government spending came from grants in aid from the
federal government.
Why are some apparently similar programs designed as grants to states while others are administered by the
central government? For example, Medicare (health care for the aged) and the hospitals of the Veteran’s
Administration are administered by the federal government, but the Medicaid (health care for the poor) and various
social assistance programs e.g., the Social Services Block Grant, and the Children and Families Services Programs
operate through grants to states.
One theory is that grants are preferred over direct central government provision when the particular type of projects
calls for it. With grants, the federal government is able to encourage state and local governments to incorporate the
“spillover” effects from their projects – the grants cover the additional costs for projects that have impacts that affect
jurisdictions outside the locality’s borders.
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Another theory is based on the path dependency. By developing a federal-state pathway through practiced use,
certain agencies are better positioned to develop new programs as grants. However, there is a lot of variation in
program design even within the same agencies. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) Public and Indian Housing Programs bureau uses grants to states for its programs (e.g., the Tenant Based,
and Project-based Rental Assistance programs), while the Federal Housing Administration, also part of HUD, and
the largest mortgage insurer in the world, operates through direct provision. If minimizing program delivery costs by
using grants were the sole motivation for congressional committees, we would expect more homogeneity within
agencies and bureaus.
Our theory is based on principal –agent theory; the agent implementing and executing a program will significantly
influence the content of the program, such as determining a target population to receive benefits. However,
Congress may not automatically trust the President or federal agencies to deliver program resources as they
intended, particularly when different political parties control separate branches of government.
Therefore, when designing new programs, Congress can opt to avoid federal agencies that it considers partisan or
oriented toward different program goals than the Congressional committee that is structuring the program. By
designing a program as a grant in aid, Congress can partially circumvent federal agencies for program delivery
responsibilities.
We argue that depending on whether the states or the federal bureaucracy and President have policy preferences
closer to the Congress’ determines the structure of the program.  We test this hypothesis and several competing
explanations in an empirical analysis covering federal government program creations from 1976 – 2008.We
examined the political and economic conditions present in the year before a program was created to understand
what contributed to the choice of direct central government provision or a grant program structure.
Partisanship seems to play a role in the choice of program design so that when the President and Congress belong
to different parties the likelihood of grant design increases. We also found that when Congress and a federal bureau
are perceived to share the same partisan orientation, the likelihood of a grant to the states is reduced. On the other
hand, when the Congress views a federal bureau in partisan terms, believed to be at odds with those of Congress,
the likelihood of a grant to the states increases.
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We also tested the degree to which shared ideological preferences by Congress, and the President and agencies
affects the choice of program design using DW Nominate scores. During both Republican and Democratic Congress
years, increased ideological differences or separation between Congress and the President is positively related to
the likelihood of a grant design. In addition, during years in which the Republicans controlled Congress, the
perceived ideology of the federal agencies also mattered– with less ideological compatibility, the greater the chance
of a program being designed as a grant.
These findings supplement rather than supplant previous hypotheses about the factors that influence the choice of
program design. Consistent with the expectations of cooperative federalism, we also find that when an agency has a
history of grant making, Congress is more likely to propose grants rather than central provision. Previous state
experience with grant programs and the opportunity to piggyback on existing state and local distribution networks
makes the creation of another grant program more likely. Moreover, as the greater the share of existing spending on
grants in aid programs in an agency’s budget, the greater the likelihood that new programs will be designed as
grants.
Formally, programs are designed to accomplish programmatic ends. However, in reality, Congress also uses
program design to reflect its partisan and ideological goals. Grants permit Congress to avoid having to rely on
federal agencies that may have different partisan or ideological preferences than the Congress. Grants may enable
welfare gains from decentralization, especially by offering lower program delivery costs, but they are also an
important tool for Congress as a way to overcome agency problems.
This article is based on the paper, ‘The Political Economy of Program Design’, in American Politics Research.
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